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1. Introduction 
This report describes the proceedings and outcomes of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) workshop IST-128 / RWS-019, titled “Cyber Attack 
Detection, Forensics and Attribution for Assessment of Mission Impact,” organized 
by the NATO Science and Technology Organizations’ (STO) Information Systems 
and Technology (IST) panel. The workshop was held at the Istanbul Technical 
University, in Istanbul, Turkey, on 15–17 June 2015. The workshop was NATO 
Unclassified and open to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and to the 
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations.   
The STO’s mission is to help position the Nations’ and NATO’s science and 
technology (S&T) investments as a strategic enabler of the knowledge and 
technology advantage for the defense and security posture of NATO Nations and 
partner Nations. This is accomplished by conducting and promoting S&T activities 
that augment and leverage the capabilities and programs of the Alliance, of the 
NATO Nations, and the partner Nations, in support of NATO’s objectives. It is 
further accomplished by contributing to NATO’s ability to enable and influence 
security and defense-related capability development and threat mitigation in NATO 
Nations and partner Nations, in accordance with NATO policies; and by supporting 
decision making in the NATO Nations and NATO. 
The immediate sponsor of this workshop, IST is one of the 7 panels whose role it 
is to implement, on behalf of the S&T Board, the STO mission with respect to 
information systems technology. The advancement and exchange of techniques and 
technologies to provide timely, affordable, dependable, secure, and relevant 
information to warfighters, planners, and strategists, as well as enabling 
technologies for modelling, simulation, and training are the focus of this panel. The 
IST covers the fields of information warfare and assurance, information and 
knowledge management, communications and networks and architecture and 
enabling technologies. 
The motivation for the workshop had to do with the fact that the success of a 
military mission is highly dependent on the communications and information 
systems (CISs) that support the mission and their use in the cyber battlespace. The 
inexorably growing dependency on computational information processing for 
weapons, intelligence, communication, and logistics systems continues to increase 
the vulnerability of missions to various cyber threats. Attacks on CISs or other 
cyber incidents degrade or disrupt the usage of CISs, and the resulting mission 
capability, performance, and completion. Such incidents are expected to increase 
in frequency and sophistication.  
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Thus, in initiating this workshop, the IST panel felt that there is a need to address 
the technology and procedures to characterize the impact of cyber-attacks on the 
mission. Such an impact analysis must necessarily include a broad range of cyber 
analysis activities: detect attacks in a mission-supporting manner, assess damages 
relevant to the mission, investigate impacts on mission elements, recover from 
attacks in order to continue missions to the maximum extent possible, and decide 
on how to respond to cyberattacks in a manner that maximizes mission success. 
Additionally, the IST panel believed, forensics methods and tools are necessary to 
determine key facts relevant to assessing mission impact. Such tools are used for 
evidence collection, analysis of the attack, identification of the attacker, 
understanding the attack, damage assessment, and attribution of attackers. 
Dependent on the mission and the type of an attack, there may be different degrees 
of relative importance and resources attached to attack detection, continuity of the 
military mission, damage assessment, evidence collection, attribution, and other 
activities. Usage of related methods, procedures, tools, or technology will depend 
on the requirements of the mission.  
This workshop, therefore, was to focus on identifying practice and research 
challenges, gaps, and approaches – current and future – to assessment of mission 
impact due to a cyberattack. Because it was thoughts that such an assessment is 
inseparable from, and impossible without, attack detection, forensics, and 
attribution, the workshop also intended to explore how these activities and related 
technologies and methods should support the assessment of mission impact. The 
initial announcement of the workshop is found in Appendix A. The final program 
of the workshop is found in Appendix B.  
The workshop gathered a total of 56 participants from 9 countries. The participants 
included authors and presenters of 12 technical papers and briefs. The workshop 
attracted 2 types of papers: full papers and position papers. A full paper is a 
technical paper (between 2500–5000 words) that presents results of novel research 
and is subject to evaluation criteria of a typical technical conference. A position 
paper is short (between 500–1500 words) and reflects the views of the author – 
usually a discussion of research challenges, gaps, and approaches – without 
necessarily presenting a supporting research. The papers are found in an 
accompanying volume: Proceedings of the NATO IST-128 Workshop: Assessing 
Mission Impact of Cyberattacks.1 
The introductory session of the workshop comprised 3 talks that welcomed the 
participants and offered an overview of the organizations and topics involved. It 
was followed by 4 technical sessions that totaled 12 technical talks.  
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The first technical session focused on the need to gain insights into the intent, 
motivations, and capabilities of the attackers, in order to understand the intended 
and actual mission impact. The second technical session explored whether, and to 
what extent, it is possible to understand the mission impact by analyzing the 
observable cyber signal and events, through such means as are normally associated 
with cyber intrusion detection, forensics, and malware analysis. The third technical 
session discussed the need for models of missions and systems that support 
missions and the approaches to constructing such models. The fourth technical 
session investigated the means by which mission impact could be simulated or 
modeled.  
The last day of the workshop was limited to 1 half-day session. In a structured 
brainstorming process, that session integrated and analyzed the overall results and 
findings of the workshop. The participants divided into 3 brainstorming teams. The 
first team aimed to summarize the state of the art in mission impact assessment, 
including the key gaps. The second team was asked to envision the future state of 
the mission impact assessment 10–20 years from now. The third analyzed the 
discussions of the 4 previous sessions in order to distill the key research directions 
that the community should pursue. The 3 teams then presented and discussed their 
findings in a plenary session. Finally, the workshop formulated key ideas for the 
follow-on activity for consideration by the NATO IST panel. 
A few disclaimers are in order here. First, not every author of the report or 
participant of the workshop agrees with every (or any) opinion presented in the 
workshop’s report. Second, all statements of fact or opinion presented in this report 
are those of the workshop participants and do not reflect positions or views of their 
employers or any organizations with which they are affiliated.    
2. Findings of the Workshop 
2.1 The Key Finding: The Primacy of a Model-driven Paradigm 
The original expectations of the workshop’s organizers, although not particularly 
explicit, were reflected in the title of the workshop: it was assumed that the key to 
addressing the challenges of mission impact assessment had to do with a form of 
integration of intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, and related 
traditional disciplines of cyber defense. The answer that emerged from the 
workshop, however, was decidedly different. 
The workshop witnessed the emergence of a very strong and clear consensus. The 
key to solving the mission impact assessment problem, the workshop’s participants 
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argued, was in adopting and developing a new model-driven paradigm. It requires 
creation and validation of mechanisms of modeling the organization whose mission 
is subject to assessment, the mission (or missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable 
systems that support the mission. The models are then used to simulate or otherwise 
portray the impacts of the cyber-attacks.  
In addition, such model-based analysis could be used to explore multiple alternative 
mitigation and work-around strategies – an essential part of coping with mission 
impact – and select the optimal course of mitigating actions. Only such a paradigm 
can be expected to provide meaningful, actionable information about the mission 
impacts that have not been seen before or do not match prior experiences and 
patterns. 
To be sure, the model-driven paradigm of mission impact assessment does not 
imply that traditional disciplines of cyber defense, such as vulnerability analysis, 
intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, and 
recovery, are irrelevant to the topic of impact assessment. Rather, these tasks 
themselves can benefit from – and be integrated into the overall framework of – the 
model-driven paradigm. For example, intrusion detection, especially for zero-day 
or polymorphic attacks, would greatly benefit from the ability to model the 
observable effects of a hypothetic attack.  
Based on these findings, the workshop proposed an exploratory team activity that 
focuses on a study of potential approaches and likely barriers to applying model-
driven paradigm to a broad range of cyber defense activities, including but not 
limited to mission impact assessment. 
2.2 Mission Impact Assessment Problem Formulation 
Appropriate formulation of a problem is the key to its successful solution. What 
constitutes a successful mission impact assessment (MIA) solution depends, in turn, 
on who are the users of the solution. Therefore, the workshop’s participants argued 
for more involvement of the “stakeholders” – primarily end users – in formulating 
the MIA problem. For example, commanders need decision support at 
“commander” level – they are much less interested in technical details. For these 
reasons, future techniques of MIA may specifically focus – and the very problem 
of MIA may be so formulated – on supporting the cyber security decision-making 
process, and particularly on tools that teach and train decision makers, and support 
them. 
Determining the correct users, however, depends on knowing where MIA belongs 
in the broader scheme of things. One way to position MIA in the context of a 
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broader cyber defense concept is to consider MIA as a part of the big control loop 
that strives to keep the controlled “plant” – the mission – within the prescribed 
space of secure states. The output of this controller is a set of corrective actions, or 
a course of actions, designed to keep the plant in the secure state. Parenthetically, 
among the actions that could be taken to correct or prevent the mission impact one 
is particularly salient – deterrence. MIA can help formulate the nature and extent 
of the appropriate deterrence action.  
In this formulation, then, MIA is the component of the control system that measures 
how much the plant has deviated or will deviate from the desired state. Once we 
say “how much,” we must consider what exactly we quantify when we measure the 
deviation from security to lesser security. To put it differently, a formal 
quantification of a utility function is needed. Some of the current approaches to 
MIA are based on heuristic scoring. To oversimplify, the assessor sums up the 
“impact points” and declares that the total impact on the mission is, let’s say, 73 
points. Clearly, this leaves much to be desired in terms of theoretical rigor. 
Similarly, to say that “The mission impact is 70% failure” is very difficult to 
interpret. For example, even with a 70% mission failure (whatever that means), the 
operator may still be able to reach a key goal. 
Perhaps a more principled approach to measures would be to use traditional 
characteristics of security – confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). 
Unfortunately, aspects of CIA for missions are not well defined or understood – in 
particular, measuring integrity and confidentiality is poorly understood. 
Furthermore, one can argue that in cyber-physical systems CIA is not particularly 
meaningful, and a better triad is observability, controllability, and operability 
(OCO). 
Other ways to express quantitative output of MIA would be to measure mission 
impact as a reduction in tangible attributes of the system, such as the network 
bandwidth, delay, or power use. Yet another approach would be to quantify the 
distance from the achievable states to desired states, for example, via the cost of the 
corrective actions that would bring the plant to the desired, secure state. All this 
suggests that a formal language, a formal mathematics of mission security, would 
be highly desirable to give MIA a solid quantitative foundation.  
Appropriate formulation of the MIA problem also requires a choice of the right 
level of abstraction. When formulated and solved at a very abstract level, the 
solution may not give adequate insights into what actions – often very specific and 
detailed – need to be considered. On the other hand, when formulated at a very 
detailed level, the problem demands a very intricate model that is far too expensive 
to construct. Some workshop participants argued that a shift must occur from the 
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enterprise-scale problem – common in today’s practice – to more meaningful 
tactical scale. One argument for more detailed formulations is that that seemingly 
small attacks on mission activities can have large effects, as confirmed by some 
simulation studies. 
Although so far we discussed mainly the control-theoretic style of the MIA problem 
formulation, we should not overlook the game-theoretic (or game-playing 
simulation) perspective. This would be natural, considering that the cybersecurity 
problem is highly adversarial in nature. Because it involves intelligent, strategically 
thinking adversaries, as opposed to random deviations in the plant operation, a 
game perspective seems more appropriate than a control perspective. A related and 
appropriate style of problem formulation could be a robust control with adversarial 
inputs. One could also consider a contest-game theory framework for modelling 
economic impacts of cyberattacks. Because full information is not normally 
available, the problem should be formulated as a partial information game; artificial 
intelligence techniques might help here.  
Yet another style of problem formulation that might be applicable to MIA is the 
risk analysis problem. In fact, risk analysis and MIA are closely related. Arguably, 
instead of saying, “Impact to Mission M from attack A is X,” one could say nearly 
equivalently, “Risk to Mission M from attack A is Y.” Furthermore, risk is 
successfully used in ecological impact studies, and an ecological (and biological) 
analogy may be instructive for complex cyber systems. The risk flow concept used 
in analysis of ecological systems appears to be a promising cybersecurity approach 
that may contribute to a temporal and spatial assessment of risk propagation and 
influence. In addition, many risk analysis techniques do not take into account a 
strategically thinking adversary, as game formulations do.  
While arguing for a model-driven paradigms for MIA, with either a control, game, 
or risk perspective, we must not dismiss entirely different yet complementary 
approaches. For example, analysis of malware found on friendly systems or 
otherwise captured in the wild can be an important help in MIA. Malware analysis 
and reverse engineering may reveal the adversary’s intent regarding the mission 
impact that the malware was designed to inflict. 
If all the above sounds very complex, that is because it is. Despairing of this 
complexity, one might be tempted to ask if a much simpler formulation might be 
adopted. For example, a pattern-matching approach like, “if you see pattern of 
evidence E, conclude that impact is X.” However, the workshop’s participants did 
not feel that the MIA problem lends itself to much simplification. Instead, model-
driven approaches were deemed most promising, which brings us to the question 
of what should be included in a good model. 
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2.3 Model Content  
The workshop exhibited a rather strong agreement on the fundamental components 
of a model required for MIA. These were generally understood to be the models of 
the organization (or military unit), its business processes (often decomposed into 
functions and tasks), the missions executed through the business processes, and the 
technical systems that support the missions. Relations, influences, and 
dependencies – quantitatively characterized – between all these entities and their 
sub-entities need to be modeled. Even the physical environment of a mission may 
need to be modeled, as well as the sensors and actuators that sense and affect the 
environment, because they also can be subjects of cyber or deception attacks. 
Because the MIA problem is so fundamentally adversarial in nature, it was widely 
recognized that one needs a comprehensive model for adversary characterization, 
and behavior understanding and prediction. Models should also include an 
environment property, attacks property, and target property, including modeling of 
these 3 elements and relations and interactions between them. We discuss adversary 
modeling in more detail in the next section.  
In addition to describing the structure of the problem, models must capture its 
dynamics. There are several very different meanings of dynamics in MIA models. 
First, the structure itself changes rapidly. For example, the servers supporting a 
mission might be taken down for maintenance and then brought up on line again or 
reassigned to another mission. The model would need to be updated continually to 
reflect such changes. Second, when a cyber-attack impacts a mission, the defenders 
and operators of the mission and supporting systems often show remarkable ability 
to work around an established process, for example, to redesign the business 
process rapidly and radically. Third, even in a very static structure of the business, 
actions are dynamic – they start, proceed, and stop at points in time. This dynamic 
has to be captured in a model. Fourth, the characteristics of components and 
relations within the model may change depending on the context. For example, the 
criticality of systems change during different missions, various simultaneous 
missions can each place a different criticality on the same shared systems, and the 
organization will have a time-dependent and dynamically changing aggregate 
dependency on its systems and other assets. 
Dynamics associated with the adversary’s behavior are particularly complex, and 
we consider them next. 
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2.4 Models of Adversary 
Mission impact has to be considered in the context of what impact the adversary 
desires. If we know, or are able to estimate, the intents, motivations, and 
anticipations of the adversary, the impact of the adversary on our missions, or the 
intended impact, would be easier to assess. It should be noted that in this section 
we consider the adversary rather abstractly; in particular, we do not assume that the 
adversary can be modeled as an individual human or a collection of individual 
humans. That perspective is explored in a later section.   
A model for adversary characterization and behavior understanding and prediction 
should be sufficiently comprehensive. In particular, the model should include 
properties of the environment in which the cyber conflict occurs; the properties of 
the attacks and targets that area available to the adversary; and relations and 
interactions between all such elements, all this in addition to the properties of the 
adversary itself.  
Naturally, properties and characteristics of the adversary are often unknown, or can 
be assumed only with a significant degree of uncertainty. Modeling tools should 
allow representation of such uncertainties and even unknowns.  
Modeling of the cyber adversary can be helped by analysis of its testing of cyber 
weapons, of which a number of examples are known. Testing of weapons is critical 
to the adversary and is detectable by us. Tests tell us much about the adversary and 
about potential mission impacts. Therefore, we need a program, framework, and 
sensors to be developed for collection and analysis of such tests. 
We can also learn from modeling experiences in earlier decades and against 
different types of weapons. In particular, work done on understanding the adversary 
behaviors for purposes of nuclear exchanges has been seen as fairly successful (for 
example, no nuclear exchange has happened to this date) and is potentially a useful 
analogy for cyber conflicts. On the other hand, how sure are we that we really know 
interests, intentions, and strategies of nuclear adversaries? The Cuban crisis seems 
a counter-example. Is it not a misleading analogy? For example, a cyber conflict is 
much less constrained in its effects than a nuclear conflict.  
A powerful determinant of adversary behavior is the adversary’s expectations of 
our response. Thus, it is important to understand the role of deterrence – the 
measures we can take to prevent hostile actions by an adversary – in a cyber 
conflict. An adversary model should help answer questions like, what does the 
adversary wants to do and what do they expect us to do? 
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Currently, little is either understood or practiced with respect to deterrence. 
Arguably, with a consistent and well-understood practice of deterrence, impacts of 
cyber actions by an adversary may be more predictable. Unlike in the case of 
nuclear deterrence, cyber deterrence might be possible without a threat of human 
victims; the effects could be strictly limited to impacts on industrial and financial 
infrastructure, for example. 
Yet another difference between cyber and nuclear cases is that the theory of nuclear 
conflict relies on a geopolitical approach. Cyber operations, in the other hand, are 
largely geography-independent, difficult to attribute to a specific state, and often 
perpetrated by non-state actors, or state-sponsored but otherwise non-state actors. 
Economic rather than geopolitical perspectives might work better in the case of a 
cyber conflict. 
Analogies other than nuclear conflict might be better for cyber conflicts. The 
workshop participants discussed the possible terrorism and counter-terrorism 
analogies. Whether we can claim much success in understanding and modeling 
terrorist adversaries is an open question. 
2.5 Models of Humans 
When the adversary is an individual human, or a group of individuals that we find 
appropriate to model individually, we should consider techniques of cognitive 
modeling of individual human minds. Such models can help predict how 
adversaries (cyber-attackers) formulate their goals and thereby tell us about the 
intended or actual mission impact of the adversary’s actions. Tools like Adaptive 
Control of Thought—Rational (ACT-R) are popular for cognitive modeling and 
might be applicable to modeling behaviors of cyber-attackers. Cognitive modeling 
of individuals is proven to be possible, and validated tools for such modeling do 
exist. Still, this area tends to be a rather early research field.  
Although we have focused on modeling the adversary, models of defenders should 
not be overlooked. To assess the likely mission impact, we need to know how a 
human cyber defender reacts to cyber-attacks. Errors committed by defenders 
determine the extent of mission impact. A defender may fail to recognize a threat 
and to take appropriate actions, thereby enabling a greater mission impact. A 
defender may fall a victim to deception committed by an attacker. A defender may 
fail to undertake a suitable work-around when a mission is impacted. A defender 
may also misinterpret mission impacts when they occur. All this is highly relevant 
to the MIA problem. 
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Whether one models an attacker or a defender, the model needs to be rich enough 
to reflect “irrational” aspects of human cognition, such as cognitive biases. These 
are particularly important in the high-pressure, high-tempo, non-intuitive world of 
cyber operations. Impact of dynamic learning must be considered to account for 
rapid evolution of knowledge in cyber conflicts. Game-theoretic approaches should 
be included in order to account for the highly adversarial nature of cyber operations. 
Because both the attacker and the defender operate often with very limited 
awareness of each other’s actions, situational awareness of both should be modeled. 
One of the workshop’s presentations pointed out the importance of situational 
awareness in achieving impact on the opponent’s mission. 
In many cases, however, both the defender and the attacker are best modeled not as 
individual human cognitive actors, but rather as organizations. Organizational 
modeling is studied by a community of researchers in the political science field that 
is distinct from the community of cognitive modelers. It would be worth exploring 
how that community might help solving the MIA problem. 
2.6 Model Construction 
The current practice of constructing models for MIA is almost entirely manual in 
nature. As such, model construction is very time consuming, expensive, and 
difficult to document, inspect, and validate. Maintenance of such models – also 
manual – is also expensive. Quantitative characterization of dependencies between, 
for example, business functions and supporting technical assets, is largely a matter 
of asking the presumed subject matter experts (SMEs) for a number, such as a 
conditional probability. The guessing of such numbers of SMEs is expensive and 
the verity of numbers is doubtful.  
Still, manual construction of models for MIA problems is feasible, even if 
expensive. For example, Analyzing Mission Impacts of Cyber Actions (AMICA) 
(reported in one of the workshop’s papers) is a comprehensive MIA modeling and 
simulation tool with a fully implemented military “business” model. It relies on 
manually crafted models. 
Some tools exist that allow essentially manual yet computer-aided construction of 
business models. The widely available Business Process Management (BPM) tools 
fall into this category. This may be important because, in general, systems (and 
networks/infrastructure) are better understood than missions (business), and the 
availability of BPM tools can help close this gap. 
Ideally, however, we would like to see the bulk of MIA models constructed 
automatically, perhaps by observing a business process and its cyber defense 
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operations, and automatically learning or inferring a model. One of the workshop’s 
presentations described an approach where significant part of a model was 
automatically derived from the observed network flows.  
Modeling of missions can be assisted by decomposing missions hierarchically into 
sub-missions, e.g., strategic into tactical. Although this aids in simplifying and 
better understanding of mission, it adds the problem of modeling complex 
interactions between elements of the decomposed structure. As in any model, it is 
important to balance granularity and determine the minimum necessary level of 
fidelity. 
2.7 Data Requirements 
Modelling and simulation techniques depend upon availability of large empirical 
datasets, and MIA problems are no exception. All aspects of models we have 
discussed depend on availability of data that can be used to create model elements. 
Data are needed to create, validate, and maintain such models. Therefore, it is 
necessary to establish a rigorous, comprehensive program of automated collection 
and, in some cases, manual maintenance of the data. 
Examples of the required data include the topology of the information technology 
(IT) and communication systems under consideration; the cyber vulnerabilities of 
the software and hardware involved; the business processes of the organization; the 
complex interdependencies between missions, services, and infrastructure; and 
behaviors of cyber actors.  
3. Conclusion 
3.1 Selected Observations on the Current State of R&D in MIA 
(Outcome of Brainstorming Sessions) 
• A degree of maturity has been achieved in models of dependencies between 
cyber assets and physical assets. 
• Linking attack graphs and missions has been demonstrated. 
• Examples exist of models that use game theory and control theory for the 
purposes of MIA. 
• Attempts have been made to model the cyber adversary. 
• Comprehensive examples exist where certain business processes were 
modeled with sufficient fidelity to be used for MIA. 
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• There is understanding and some examples of how to quantify vulnerability, 
risk and resiliency in order to assess mission impact. 
• Relevant models for risk assessment do exist. 
• Generally, human inputs are manually collected to populate models with 
parameters. 
3.2 Selected Suggestions for the Future of R&D in MIA 
(Outcome of Brainstorming Sessions) 
3.2.1 Operations 
• Methods and techniques to reduce the time to detect the cyberattacks or 
compromises so that mission impact can be minimized.  
• Novel architectures that minimize the mission impact by design 
• Defense tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can be explicitly 
optimized to control the extent of mission impact. 
• Intuitive situational awareness to support commander decision making and 
automated execution of actions 
3.2.2 Formalisms 
• Formal languages for MIA that capture mission, attacker, defense, security 
architecture, etc. 
• Formal models for situation awareness, such as hierarchical concurrent 
probabilistic finite state machine (FSM) 
• Formal language for decision making integrated with formal cyber language 
3.2.3 Automation 
• Automated infrastructure model creation 
• Extract model parameters automatically from logs 
• Automated population of situational awareness models 
• Automated support to model validation, and to training and exercises  
• Appropriate mix of automated and human response to mission impact 
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3.2.4 Data  
• Collect ground-truth data on attacker and defender behaviors 
• Remote cyber sensing for collecting attacker data 
• Open source, vendors and users are valuable providers of data 
• Better characterization and use of synthetic data and sanitized real data 
3.3 Recommendations for a Follow-on Activity 
A suitable follow-on to this workshop would be an exploratory team (ET) activity 
that focuses on a study of potential approaches and likely barriers to applying a 
model-driven paradigm to a broad range of cyber defense activities, including but 
not limited to, mission impact assessment. 
The ET could be titled, tentatively, “The Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated 
Approaches to Cyber Security.” The ET would explore the possibility of using a 
multi-purpose, integrated system of models for guiding a broad range of 
cybersecurity operations: vulnerability analysis, intrusion prevention, intrusion 
detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, mission impact assessment, and recovery. 
The team will investigate whether such a paradigm can be expected to provide 
meaningful, actionable information about cyber activities and the resulting impacts 
that have not been seen before or do not match prior experiences and patterns. 
The workshop already identified a number of research and development (R&D) 
challenges associated with model-driven approaches to MIA. Therefore, it will be 
the ET’s charter to answer a number of questions, such as the following: 
• How likely these challenges be overcome in the near- and mid-term? 
• Are there applications of the model-driven paradigm that are more likely to 
prove fruitful in near-term for the MIA problem? 
• What can be learned and adopted from the Canadian Automated Computer 
Network Defence (ARMOUR) demonstrator and European Union 
PANOPTESEC prototype, which explore a related model-based approach? 
• What are ways to populate and validate models in an affordable fashion? 
• Is the model-driven paradigm defeated by ever-growing diversity and 
diffusion of IT infrastructures, such as Internet of Things (IoT)? 
• What commercial tools are emerging that can support the model-driven 
paradigm? 
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• Can any standards can be leveraged to enable model-driven R&D to be 
conducted in an interoperable manner? If not, should candidates for 
standards be defined within an STO activity? 
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List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms 
ACT-R Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational 
AMICA Analyzing Mission Impacts of Cyber Actions  
ARMOUR Automated Computer Network Defence   
BPM Business Process Management  
CIA confidentiality, integrity, and availability  
CISs communications and information systems 
ET exploratory team  
FSM finite state machine  
IoT Internet of Things  
IST Information Systems and Technology  
IT information technology  
MD Mediterranean Dialogue  
MIA mission impact assessment  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
OCO observability, controllability, and operability  
PtP Partnership for Peace  
R&D research and development  
S&T science and technology  
SME subject matter expert 
STO Science and Technology Organization  
TTPs tactics, techniques, and procedures  
 
 
  
